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Does it spark joy? Emotions, Intuition, and Affective Decision-Making

Cognitive sciences have been dominated by dual process models of decision-making that presuppose the existence of two distinct systems; a fast, intuitive emotionally driven system (system 1) and slow, deliberative, controlled system that is rational rather than emotional (system 2).  Until the last couple of decades, decision research favoured the latter over the former. Rationalist decision-making calls for unlimited time, knowledge and cognitive resources that human beings simply do not have. To compensate for these, people rely on simplified strategies or mental shortcuts called heuristics. One such shortcut involves relying on the positive or negative affective feeling associated with the decision stimulus, that is, the affect heuristic.

According to the affect heuristic, an overall affective impression associated (consciously or unconsciously) with a mental representation of an object or event, serves as a cue while making a decision. An excellent example of this, would be Marie Kondo’s well-known decluttering strategy called KonMarie. Kondo recommends that while deciding whether to keep or discard a household item, rather than relying on a set of tidying criteria or engaging in long deliberations, simply ask yourself, “Does it spark joy?” If the item inspires joy or evokes a bit of a thrill, then it is worth holding on to. Affect-based evaluations are quick, automatic and efficient in navigating a complex, uncertain world plagued with choices. Compared to seemingly rationalistic reflective thinking, affective judgements are associated with lesser cognitive strain. They are especially useful when time is limited or the decision is complex.

The neurobiological evidence for the role of effect in decision-making comes from the somatic marker hypothesis. Portuguese-American neuroscientist Antonio Damasio and his colleagues at the University of Iowa studied patients with bilateral damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex, a brain region that has since been implicated in several aspects of social cognition such as emotional processing decision-making. They noted that despite having normal intelligence, memory and reasoning capabilities, the patients exhibited impairment in real-life decisions and failed to learn from past mistakes. To elaborate on these findings, Bechara and Damasio (2005) conducted a seminal study that demonstrated the role of emotions in decision-making, using the Iowa Gambling task.  The task requires the participants to make a series of card selections from 4 decks marked A, B, C and D, with the aim of maximizing profits. In the task, the participants are expected to make a series of card selections from 4 decks marked A, B, C, D in order to maximize profits in the long run. Unbeknownst to the participants, decks, A and B, were disadvantageous (immediate high gains but a long-term loss) while decks C and D were advantageous (smaller frequent gains but a long-term gain). The study showed that normal controls learned to avoid the disadvantageous decks while patients with damage to the ventromedial cortex prefrontal (VM patients) maintained a preference for the disadvantageous decks. After adding a physiological measure to the experimental paradigm, it was found that both normal controls and VM patients generated skin conductance responses (representative of emotional arousal) in reaction to picking up the card. With practice, normal controls began generating anticipatory SCRs before picking up the cards, which were more pronounced for disadvantageous decks rather than advantageous ones. Thus, the memories of previous painful losses intuitively led them to avoiding disadvantageous decks on a hunch before becoming explicitly aware of it. On the other hand, VM patients completely failed to generate SCRs as their lesions deprived them of the ability to register the previous painful losses and generate warning emotional signals. These observations led Bechara and Damasio to proposing the somatic marker hypothesis.

The hypothesis describes a covert, emotional mechanism of decision making concerned with the evaluation of prospective consequences of an action.  These consequences (represented as mental images), when considered, trigger implicitly generated bodily or visceral feeling states (somatic markers) with a positive or negative emotional valence. These somatic markers in turn, serve as a source of bias in guiding our behaviour towards rational, optimal decisions. Positive and negative somatic markers serve as an incentive towards and warning against the selected behaviour, respectively. The somatic marker hypothesis has also been speculated to explain the dysfunctional decision-making in clinical populations with addiction and psychopathy. Moreover, it lends support to a universally experienced form of pre-rational insight, often accompanied by visceral sensations; gut feelings.

Emotions are clearly an integral component of decision-making. But there are also instances when emotions disrupt the decision-making process or cloud our judgement. According to Bechara and Damasio, the aforementioned somatic states are only beneficial to the decision outcome as long as they are relevant to the decision at hand. The presence of emotions unrelated to the decision may indeed prove to be disruptive. For instance, the anxiety about being stopped by the police may prevent a driver from speeding. In this case, the consequences of not following traffic rules are relevant to the decision about speeding and help the driver decide optimally. However, the residual frustration from an earlier fight may lead the driver to speed on the highway. Despite being completely irrelevant to the decision about speeding, these feelings may lead to a suboptimal decision.

In a similar vein, Harvard psychologist Lerner and her colleagues analysed the current literature on emotions and decision making and proposed the Emotion-Imbued Choice (EIC) model. This model makes a distinction between integral emotions, those arising from the decision at hand, and current emotions which refer to circumstantial emotions felt at the time of the decision. Current emotions can be influenced by 5 potential sources of bias: characteristics of the decision-maker, characteristics of the choice options, anticipatory influence of the predicted emotions, frustration caused by contemplating the decision and emotions arising from an unrelated event. While predicted emotions act as rational inputs in the decision-making process, incidental emotions carried over from an unrelated event may disrupt it.

Affect is an important source of information in decision-making. However, it is a double-edged sword. Though integral emotions provide valuable implicit knowledge and quick environmental appraisals to aid advantageous decisions, unwanted emotional influences derail this process by overriding reason. It may be preferable to be swayed by affect while decluttering your closet, but decisions with life-altering consequences still call for some additional system 2 thinking. 

Isha Puntambekar

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